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中国农村合作化运动及其解体 (The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China)/周大勇

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Student:Dayong Zhou

dayong_77@hotmail.com


The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China

周大勇 (Zhou,Dayong)

Abstract: the process of de-collectivization took place 25 years ago, however it was uncompleted, which determined that china has to make great effort to continue his rural reform, in order to liberate the peasant and the status of rural region as the Party promised. In China, the non-privatization reform occurred along with the de-collectivization was a uncompleted reform, which remains the defects of both collectivization and small-scale peasant economy, therefore it restricts the development of the rural society, however, the current system seems unable also reluctantly to change it. This paper intents to introduce the process of the collectivization and the most important rural reform in this century, namely the de-collectivization, the demonstrates the progression of de-collectivization, its characters as well as the problems left to be solve.
Keywords: collectivization De-collectivization collective ownership incomplete

Foreword
I am pleased that I am allowed to write the term paper about China. China was influenced by Marxism and walked in detour of history for half century. Before Marxism bankrupted in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China had adopted a different way to reform from those countries. Because of the difference in aspects of historical evolution, political forms and natural environment, it’s hard to compare the rural society of China with these former socialism countries directly, also, the progression of collectivization and its end are different in two continents.
Rural china before collectivization
Collectivization was a mark system of the socialist state. Although in the era of Utopian socialism, Robert Owen for example has already attempted to set up the collective farm, but it wasn’t pursued by force strength of government. Even the founder of communism Marx didn’t agree that communism could be realized in undeveloped countries with extremely poor productivity . It was Russia, the serf country, in which Communist took power without adequate preparation; collectivization was implemented by force, in order to consolidate the rule in grass-root countryside. This experience has influenced China and Eastern Europe, because one of the merits of the collectivization lies in being easy to be managed, the other lies in being easy to deprive peasants.
China was a backward country, which suffered from ignorance and war for centuries. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population were farmers and live in one of some 900,000 villages, which have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages were not self-contained, self-sufficient units. Clusters of villages centered on small market towns, which linked them to the wider economy and society by providing not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of specialized services. The traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene, normally ruled villages. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. However, they traditionally interpreted central policies and national values for villagers. As in feudal relationship, the peasants and gentry live depend on each other. Gentry provided land to poor peasants and tenant, and work with rich and middle peasants to secure the order in village, for instance opening school and building basic infrastructures to maintain there social status. In Chinese history, at the beginning of very dynasty, the land relationship between landlord and poor peasants were comparably fair, that meant, peasant have parcel farmland to live on. But land tended to be concentrated on end every dynasty, then there might be a peasant uprising led to a new dynasty and retribution of land. This is the basic clue of social evolution in China before communist period.
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in mainland, it had to keep its promise, which it made during the period of war to encourage the peasant to join the army, that it would gave peasant their own land. The first major action took place from 1940s to early 1950s. June 1950, a new Land Reform Law of new People’s Republic was promulgated and stipulated nullification of the feudal land ownership system, and institutionalization of the system of land ownership by peasants, in which the Party sent agents to every village to carry out the land reform policy. This in itself was an unprecedented show of political power and the resolution of transform an old society. The reform was successful, because the peasants supported the policy; most of them had been waiting for the reform for long time. In the light of the reform law, land were redistribute from the landlords, land-owning trusts or wealthier families to the poor segments in the same village; village elites, who might be expected to go up against the Party and its programs were brought down; new leadership was established by poor peasants who showed the most loyalty to the party's goals; instead of kinship group or patron-client ties, class status became new relationship among villagers.
the process of Collectivization
However, the Party’s leaders were not satisfied with the privatization of land, at one hand, such ownership, according to the doctrine of socialism, should have been abolished in the state of socialism, at another hand, private ownership of small peasantry had no function of property accumulation for the country. At that time, in order to accelerate the construction of socialism, China had launched The First Five-Year Plan after the Soviet model; heavy industry development was profound stressed since the leaders of Communist Party regard socialist country as a country with developed industry sectors. However, the situation in early 1950s was not ideal for a new country. Pressing of needs for food in a country with burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, collectivize agriculture was put forward. Collectivization was regard as a method to turn countryside to stabile backing, which can be managed as semi-military and had rare contact with outside, so that the government could press the price of agricultural products by means of scissors difference between cities and countryside, and seize huge numbers of profit from agriculture economies to support the industrialization in city. At the same time, the government had already nationalized banking, industry, and even trade. Private enterprise was already virtually abolished in national wide.
Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, preliminary collectivization was launched since 1952. China's peasantry saw Chairman Mao and the Communist Party as heroic much more than Russia's peasantry had seen Stalin and the Bolsheviks as heroes, and through 1956 the peasantry cooperated with the Party. There was none of the resistance and warfare that had accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The collectivization of agriculture was basically completed with the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. The People’s Commune system was defined as a unity of politics and production, in which all members of the commune jointly owned property. Essentially, the commune system was based on private contract of its members and the principle of voluntaries and mutual benefit, however, it turned out yet as coercive institutional arrangement, which was made by government with political power. In the movement to achieve the People’ s Commune, peasants had no choice whether or not to join.
Communes were designed as large, embracing scores of villages created by combining some 20 or 30 advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, in some cases the membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000. It was instituted as an organization with functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production brigade , and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families. This kind of institution was an organization of hierarchies, in which the commune acted as political unit and top manager, the brigades played role of co-coordinators between the commune and the basic production teams. The production team was basic units of production and accounting. Since the people’s commune system was a tool established to extract resources from agriculture sector for industrialization, as a result, it neglected peasants’ incentive completely. In order to let the people’s commune system run, the central government designed an relative effective mechanism to encourage managers in each hierarchy to work enthusiastically, yet, in each level, the managers were treated differently and there was a clear difference in aspects of identity and welfare between the managers of the commune and of the brigades or production teams.
The commune was defined as administrative organ and executed the central government’s orders, and paid from central government’s budget, therefore the managers in the level of commune were “state cadres” , that means they were formal governmental officials and got wage monthly. These state cadres could be promoted and became officials of governmental divisions in higher level. Brigades and production teams were collective economic organizations, their running expenses came from production teams’ tribute. Managers in brigades level were called “collective cadres” . They were remunerated in their own production teams according to their labor quotas. Their wage was paid in the form of products instead of money. Managers in production teams were“team cadres”, they were also members of the production team. They worked as peasant like their workmates, and were paid in products according to labor quotas. Team cadres could be promoted to collective cadres. Collective and team cadres had little possibilities to be promoted and became members of state cadres. Nevertheless, as collective and team cadres had some privileges. For example, collective managers had the power of assigning state’s delivery quotas and production tasks among production teams, they determined who could enrolled in state-owned factories, universities and army. The production team managers executed the power of assigning work and distributing products among collective members. Furthermore, in the period of many political movements and class struggles, the identity of cadre could protect their families, relatives and themselves from being denounced and bullied (Tan, 1999).
At beginning, the commune itself was decorated as the representation of socialist society and had all merits of public ownership. Although nearly all the private property had been deprived, peasants had to praise the new system profusely. it was true, most poor peasants found that their lives changed, by eating in the public dining they didn’t need to worry about their own budget anymore, and by working together, they were not necessary to try their best. Following propaganda appeared in newspapers everyday:
The public dining halls are distributed in a way that members need walk only a few minutes from their homes to take their meals. On the freshly whitewashed walls of the one on Shihfuchien Street, a typical establishment, there is a big slogan in red, which reads, "High Spirits for Higher Production!" Its kitchen, to which the visitor is drawn by the aroma of food and the clatter of pots, is managed by Tu Hsiu-chen, the first volunteer cook, who has since learned large-scale catering from the chef at one of the city's restaurants.
The walls of the spacious dining room are decorated with paintings, as a home might be. Its tables and chairs, though simple, are scrubbed to a shining cleanliness. The food is fresh and tasty -- vegetables are grown by the commune itself. The staff make a special point of studying the diet and preferences of old people, children, nursing mothers and members with ailments. There is a separate room for parents with small children, provided with low tables for the little ones.( People’s Daily, 1958)
However, in practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form commune didn’t keep running well in most areas. Very soon it became clear that in most cases the communes were too clumsy to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. The cooperative led to low-efficiency, the advantages of large-scale productivity didn’t arrive as peasants anticipated, productivity began to drop and discontent emerged. The reason lies in insufficient utilization of resources and lack of incentive of peasants. At one hand, the output of cooperation comes from all members’ work, in which the tribute of single household is difficult to be measured. So that opportunism like shirking happened naturally very frequently. An effective way to prevent shirking is to have all members supervised, but the seasonal work and spatial diversity of agricultural productive activities make it difficult to totally supervise. At the other hand, although brigade and production team cadres were obliged to complete state’s planning and all kinds of deliveries, the control right and residual claim of the people’s commune system were in the state’s hand, these cadres at grass-level could not design any reasonable incentive mechanism to encourage peasants to work hard and produce according to reasonable natural condition, such as soil, irrigation and farm year. The way left for brigade and team cadres was to punish peasants by struggling against them or maltreatment. But the brigade and team cadres also belonged to members of production teams, they and their families lived in the same community with their subordinates as well, so punishing peasants could also make themselves in trouble. Moreover, under the property rights structure of the commune system, the rest of output was not belong to the commune, brigade or even production team, but to the governments of higher level. This made the supervisors’ effort unrelated to any reward. As a result, even the supervisor himself has not enough incentive to work and shirk himself sometimes. In a word, under such conditions of poor supervision, in which all the work was distributed equally among all members at the lowest level--production team, shirking became every member’s rational choice and further weakening the efficiency of the system (Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
To prevent peasants from slow down, shrinking and escaping in work, and assure the system could keep on moving, the party collected all productive equipments and forbid members in people’s commune engaging in private production and business on the one hand, and at same time deprived peasants’ right of migrating from countryside to city or between districts by means of household registration on the other hand. Nevertheless, such policies had no effect on improving incentive of peasants, but they formed at least political press on very member of people’s commune, because it turned out that everyone’s only routine is to stay in the commune and finish one’s task. Without the right to leave or get better than others, peasants commonly chose to work with little effort, e.g. a passive method, to evade production tasks assigned by leader. Little accumulation and shirking made countryside widely fall into poverty , rare rural region had good conditions to develop industry or to improve commerce, infrastructures went worse, productivity sank quickly. The most serious crisis for agricultural collectivization happened between 1959 and 1961. GNP decreased from 213.8 billion Yuan in 1958 to 180.0 billion Yuan in 1962, with an average annual reduction of 15.1% in gross industrial production value and an average annual reduction of 19.3% in gross agricultural production value from 1958 to 1960. Owing to the serious shortage of food, a great famine took place in the whole country and at least 30 million residents died (Tan, 2000). Discontent with such system broke out, in some areas, peasants didn’t want to relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. The severe crisis forced the Party to adjust their policies. From 1961 on, commune functions were reduced to administration and co-ordination, production team was confirmed as the basic unit of accounting, certain production decision making was delegated to production teams, which were allowed to retain some income to overcome problems of egalitarianism; households again allowed to have small private plots and sidelines for planting vegetables, and a limited opening markets for transaction between urban and rural areas. However, these adjustments didn’t mean to change the system of people’s commune, but only to prevent peasants from rebel. From 1966 to 1976 China suffered the disaster of Cultural Revolution , there were large institutional swings took place in this period, in which co-operative moved from small to large and from team to brigade to commune again, local free markets, sidelines and private plots was prohibited again, and political factors had a great influence on production decisions.
In late 1970s, after the Leader Chairman Mao passed away, the requirement for improving agricultural productivity came alive. Administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. To avoid frontal conflicts of wide scope with government’s policies and the main ideology, a gradual approach was adopted. The first step of reform was to divide the production team into groups and to fix yield quotas for each group. Each group signed a contract with production team, the contractual items included the conditions of using land, laborers, farm tools and draft animals, the expenditure, labor contribution, rewards for excessive labor contribution and so on. After completing the tasks assigned by the production team, the output could be distributed among work groups according to their labor quotas. And then, the further solution was put forward, namely the typical form of fixing quotas called “all-round contract”, which was initiated by a few brave peasant secretly in Fengyang county of Anhui province. this contract regulated, household was allowed to cultivated a certain parcel farmland in the group, if grain quotas assigned by the state and the collective accumulation were accomplished, the household could own all the residual output. In the light of the contract, peasants were given directly stimulation to produce. The experiment was deemed successful and popular, and it soon spread to all districts.
At another side, political situation was appropriate with the reform form below. In the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12- 18, 1977 proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four , and reiterated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the twentieth century." The reformer Deng Xiaoping was elected as vice chairman and back to political stage and suggested a series of reform plans, though many contradictions still were apparent, change of policy was regarded as necessary. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic to these reform plans were stepped up. Not only were some of those purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but also individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism.
In November 1980, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China issued the document Some Issues of Further Reinforcing and Improving the Responsibility System in Agricultural Production. This article manifest the first time that the Party accepted the production responsibility systems developing in practice. In the document fixed output quotas of farmland for each group and responsibility contracts in some specialized obligations were indicated, at the same time, the fixed output quotas for household was also regarded as positive. Under the encouragement of government’s policy and related support measures, plenty of production responsibility systems developed very rapidly in rural areas. In 1981, a wide deeper reform called fixing the contribute quote for each household (bao gan dao hu), which was much more radical, was implemented. In accordance to the system, all collective lands in production teams were to be distributed among households based on their population or laborers. The households could manage the lands, made production decisions by themselves, and bore the results. When tasks assigned by upper government and the collective accumulation, e.g. a certain quantity of grain and livestock, were completed, the remained products could be owned by the households and not distributed among members in the production team. Moreover, if the household made sure that they have enough ration, they had right to sell the left grain to state owned agricultural enterprises or consume them as they want, usually feeding livestock or making wine for example. That meant the model from Fengyang was finally admitted by Party. In October 1983, the Party and the State Counsel issued the document Notice of Separating the Co-operative from Politics and Setting Up the Township Government and required the cooperative to separate from local government. The act ordered that the people's communes were replaced by administrative townships. By the end of 1984, 98% of production teams had taken the reform of Household Responsibility System. It was until then, the collectivization system was dismantled completely.
Some Characters of De-collectivization and Problems left
No restitution
Yet, de-collectivization and the implement of the household responsibility system is neither a reform of the ownership of land nor a process of privatization. As we have mentioned above, after the Communist Party set up its own government in 1949, it started land reform and distributed lands to the poor from landlords and rich peasants. Peasant acquired parcels of land according to the labor forces, then land were registered under name of each household. Before the eve of collectivization, most of lands in rural China were legally privately owned. But when de-collectivization began, peasants did not get back their former lands again. The household responsibility system only distribute the right of manage and benefit of lands among households according to their population or laborers. So, the de-collectivization in China did not like that in most of East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but like that in Albania. That is to say, there was no restitution of land. However, in former East European Countries, whether restitution was implemented or not, the de-collectivization had symbiosis with privatization. In China, although during the process of de-collectivization there were in reality some opinions that lands should be restituted, such voices were not accepted, nor even discussed.
The reasons why restitution of land in the de-collectivization of rural China did not happen may lie in some historic reasons. First of all, although peasants in China had private ownership over lands before the collectivization, large percent of peasants owned farmlands that did not belong to them before, they obtain them from political transformation. Theoretically, violence can’t consist the legal reason of transfer of ownership over real estate, therefore even after the terrorize during the land reform at beginning of 1950s, the private ownership of lands, which was made out by the communist government, had not yet became stable and commonly accepted. However, the former landlord class had rooted off during the political movement, land contacts and register books of land title had been destroyed, no one dare to challenge the power of Communist Party anymore. Since the collectivization began soon after the land reform, the new established owner relationship was broken again, when de-collectivization came about, without supports from the central government, most of peasants only took the household responsibility system as another chance of equally distributing lands, just like the land reform in 1949. As to descendants of former landlord class, they might have not forgotten the experience of their poor ancestors’: claiming private right before the Party which regarding public ownership as universal truth is a dangerous deal.
Secondly, different from most country in former communist east European countries , in which farmers’ nominal ownership of lands was remained, even though their lands were requisitioned in collective farms without any payment, and so that it was easy for peasants in these countries to take back the land when the collective farms went over. On the contrary, in China, private ownership of land was totally abolished as soon as the people’s commune system was set up, after 20 years, the collective ownership had already fest basis. As a result, the transaction costs of restitution so high as to wipe it out. That means, even a peasant want to take back the former farmland which belonged to them, it’s very hard to him to collect the relevant evidences to support his claim, moreover, there was no legal justice process to support such application. So normal farmer would rather to accept the Household Responsibility System.
Finally, the key reason lies in the socialism system itself. Even though the Communist Party of had poor performance in leading the country and its people to wealth and happiness during socialist revolution, Chinese people have taken socialism as the characteristic of the country for grant, after all the slogan “ Socialism saved China” has been deeply impressed. So that even after the Culture Revolution, most people still propped up the Party. The Party led the rural reform and decided the de-collectivization. However, the reform is a “liberation of the rural productivity”, which suit the requirement of the Party. Because the Chinese Communist Party insisted that his mission is to realize socialism, and socialism is based on public ownership system. Collective ownership was deemed as one form of public ownership in rural regions, so that as China kept on the road of realizing socialism, “land in rural areas belong to collective” was certainly remained after rural reform, and regulated in the Constitution of 1982, which is valid till now.
At the time of de-collectivization, the dissolution of people’s commune and the wide implement of responsibility system were regard as a great innovation. According to the statistic, The Household Responsibility System did bring about a more prosperous agriculture in China. From 1978 to 1984, grain output in China increased at an annual average rate of 5% and the gross value of agriculture by 7.7% (Lin, 1997). In contrast with former European countries, the de-collectivization seems bring more benefit to Chinese peasants at beginning. So that at that time, rare peasant did realize that such a reform without transformation of ownership was incompletely. However, The natural shortcomings of the de-collectivization would surely bring a series of problems.
institutional problem: land distribution
As we showed above, the de-collectivization ran smoothly and the introduction of Household Responsibility System has got a great success, although it could not address everything as only an institutional innovation. After several years of practice, it has been already proved that there are a number of weaknesses and limitations remained from the incompletely de-collectivization. One has to confirm, that the collective ownership and contract system led to the inequity in both economic and political features.
In economic view, during the de-collectivization, farmland was distributed to individual households in form of fragmented farming units. The principle of land distribution was derived directly from collective ownership. Farmland in a village was owned by all of its members collectively. As a result, every member had equal right to claim on distribution of the land according to certain norm, which was based primarily on the size of the peasant family. In reality of China with abundant population and limited land, the amount can be distributed to each household was very small. Moreover, land differed from each other in terms of soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location and so on. In many cases, a household had to obtain pieces of land from each of the grades. as a result, the sum was not only insufficient but also disjointed and scattered around villages. Large areas of cultivated land were wasted in the form of paths and boundaries separating households' contract field. A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in 1986, among 7983 sample villages from 29 provinces, average cultivated area per household was 0.466 ha (7 mu) fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot on average 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993) . This fragmented structure of family farming has remained largely untouched after implement of contract system and has detained the possibilities of using relatively advanced mechanical agricultural equipment and infrastructures.
Under such system, farmers turned to be short-term in action. According to the distribute rule of land in household responsibility system, land is to distribute depended only on villager status, babies and villagers' new-comer such as newly married bride from other villages were all eligible claimants, which having equal rights to share equal amounts of land in this village; on the contrary, when a villager left or died, the right of land claim would automatically withdraw. As population increased, villages had to readjust the distribution structure, which further subdivided the farmland . The endless redistribution of farmland resulted in many problems, including: 1) the situation of a small and fragmented farming structure further deteriorated; 2) worrying about the risk of losing their land as well as investment, farmers had little incentives to improve land conservation and agricultural infrastructure - irrigated land, one of the most significant components of agricultural infrastructure in China, remained almost unchanged during the 1980s; 3) farmers over-exploited the soil to pursue short-term profits; 4) the course of land redistribution was also costly, it required labor and time in organization and execution. (Chen, 1999)
Another problem is that farmland was generally badly endowed with the appropriate human capital. Since egalitarianism was the general leading principle rule, which gave little consideration to interfamily differences such as labor capability, education and individual preference . As a result, some large households with a incomplete labor force could have comparably much more land to cultivate, meanwhile other smaller households, above all those specialized in agriculture, could have only inadequate land for full employment. Such kind of problem was much worse in rural areas experiencing rapid township or village industry and urbanization. In those region there was often deterioration in the agricultural labor force since most of capable labors tended not to work at home as a farmer. There were many who did not give priority to cultivation and at times even let the land lie unused. Consequently, the farmland was underutilized .
Upon preceding analyzing, we can see that, in order to pursue egalitarianism on surface in distribution of land, in the process of the de-collectivization sacrificed economic efficiency. Thus, if the land was private, then those difference arouse from distribution will decease after enough time, because the free market will lead to equal efficiency through the choose of market. However, such political background lacked from beginning on, so that the shortcoming of a non-privatization de-collectivization can’t be corrected or even be enlarged because of problem of political system.
One of the main reason is political structure over the collective ownership. First at grass-root level, it was usually the village head, who takes the power to decide distribution since decentralization. So that the cadre family or their relations will surely benefit from the distribution. Having a cadre in the family seems to be a certain prerogative in using their political status to accumulate wealth. At one hand, Village cadres may allocate more fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favorable grain sales quotas for themselves. And also, cadres have more opportunity to build personal relationship with higher level and other important departments, rural credit banks or transportation companies for example, so that they have more chance to obtain material benefit than normal peasants. As we see, most of collective enterprises and private economies in rural areas have tight relationship with local governments, at the basic level, with villager cadres, most rural enterprisers are villager leader themselves. Furthermore, cadres and their relations generally tend to break the policy of birth control, because they are capable to support more family members, and their kin will strengthen their economic and political power in return.
At another hand, though according to the election regulation of rural cadre in china, these village cadre should be elected directly by villagers, who have common interest in the community, this rule has been almost never put into practice. Under one Party system and public ownership system, all important resources are gathered in the Party’s hand, as a result, instead of election, the opinion from higher level plays a significant role, in order to carry ort the policy of Party efficiently. In fact, two factors determine the candidates in appointment of village head, one is the relationship with official of higher level, and the other is kinship. Consequently, cadre family takes all advantages to maintain their power and status through such appointment. So, cadres in rural China don’t represent the benefit of their village members, but the power of the Party as well as the family, there is no possibility for peasants to claim equality or save their from suffering as a peasant.
In a word, after a short flourish in rural China, which came along with the de-collectivization and the implement of Household Responsibility System, most peasants have to face the irrational occupation and distribution system of farmland and the political system, which is impossible to change. Besides there was strict limitation prevent peasants from abandoning their responsible land and rushing into cities, so that the peasants found it is hard to change their situation or turn it more better and free. This may explain why in rural china exists always the tendency of over population but the income of household began to decrease only after less than 10 years from the de-collectivization. As a result, land reform in China has emerged as a difficult issue in rural areas of exchange between social equality and economic efficiency. It seems obvious that since the mid-1980s the wide rural society has been caught in this predicament: where social equality or equity worsened, and at same time economic efficiency held back.. According to statistics, average net income in countryside has been slowed down for years. In 2000, the household average income only reached 272 dollars, but the Gini coefficient in China base in urban and rural areas rose from 0.21 in 1978 to more than 0. 46.

四川省风景名胜区条例

四川省人大常委会


四川省风景名胜区条例
(2010年5月28日四川省第十一届人民代表大会常务委员会第十六次会议通过)

第一章总则

第一条为了加强对风景名胜区的管理,有效保护和合理利用风景名胜资源,根据国务院《风景名胜区条例》和有关法律、行政法规的规定,结合四川省实际,制定本条例。

第二条四川省行政区域内风景名胜区的设立、规划、保护、建设、利用和管理,适用本条例。

第三条风景名胜区管理实行科学规划、统一管理、严格保护、永续利用的原则。

第四条县级以上地方人民政府应当将风景名胜资源的保护和利用纳入国民经济和社会发展规划及城乡规划,加强风景名胜区的管理,实现人与自然和谐发展。

第五条省人民政府建设行政主管部门负责全省风景名胜区的监督管理工作;市(州)、县人民政府建设行政主管部门负责本行政区域内风景名胜区的监督管理工作。

县级以上地方人民政府其他有关部门按照职责分工负责风景名胜区的有关监督管理工作。

风景名胜区设立、规划、保护、建设和管理工作所需经费列入部门综合预算。

第六条国家级、省级风景名胜区所在地县级以上地方人民政府应当设置风景名胜区管理机构,负责风景名胜区的保护、利用和统一管理工作。

省内跨行政区域的风景名胜区管理机构的设置,由省人民政府建设行政主管部门会同有关部门按规定确定。

第七条任何单位和个人都有保护风景名胜资源的义务,并有权劝阻、检举、控告破坏风景名胜资源的行为。

第八条风景名胜区所在地县级以上地方人民政府和风景名胜区管理机构应当对风景名胜区内原住居民的生产、生活给予扶持、帮助和照顾。

第二章设立

第九条风景名胜区划分为国家级风景名胜区和省级风景名胜区。

自然景观和人文景观能够反映重要自然变化过程和重大历史文化发展过程,基本处于自然状态或者保持历史原貌,具有国家代表性的,申请设立国家级风景名胜区;具有区域代表性的,申请设立省级风景名胜区。

第十条申报国家级和省级风景名胜区按照国务院《风景名胜区条例》的规定办理。新设立的风景名胜区与自然保护区不得重合或者交叉;已设立的风景名胜区与自然保护区重合或者交叉的,风景名胜区与自然保护区的规划、保护、建设和管理应当相协调。

第十一条风景名胜区批准设立并公布后,风景名胜区管理机构应当在风景名胜区主要入口建立入口标志并按批准的范围立桩,标明区界。

国家级风景名胜区的入口标志内容和标徽图案按国务院建设行政主管部门审定公布。

省级风景名胜区的入口标志内容和标徽图案由省人民政府建设行政主管部门审定公布。

第三章规划

第十二条风景名胜区经批准设立后应当依法编制风景名胜区规划。风景名胜区规划分为总体规划和详细规划。

第十三条风景名胜区总体规划的编制,应当体现人与自然和谐相处、区域协调发展和经济社会全面进步的要求,坚持保护优先、开发服从保护的原则,突出风景名胜资源的自然特性、文化内涵和地方特色。

风景名胜区总体规划应当包括下列内容:

(一)风景资源评价;

(二)生态资源保护措施、重大建设项目布局、开发利用强度;

(三)风景名胜区的功能结构和空间布局;

(四)禁止开发和限制开发的范围;

(五)风景名胜区的游客容量;

(六)有关专项规划。

风景名胜区应当自设立之日起2年内编制完成总体规划。总体规划的规划期一般为20年。

风景名胜区总体规划应当依法进行环境影响评价。

第十四条风景名胜区详细规划应当根据核心景区和其他景区的不同要求编制,确定基础设施、旅游设施、文化设施等建设项目的选址、布局与规模,并明确建设用地范围和规划设计条件。

风景名胜区详细规划,应当符合风景名胜区总体规划。

第十五条编制风景名胜区总体规划应当与国民经济和社会发展规划、城乡规划、土地利用总体规划相衔接,并符合国家有关技术规范和标准。

风景名胜区内的镇、乡、村庄规划与风景名胜区规划应当相协调。

第十六条国家级风景名胜区规划由省人民政府建设行政主管部门组织编制;省级风景名胜区规划由县级地方人民政府组织编制。

跨行政区的风景名胜区的规划,由申请设立风景名胜区的人民政府或者其建设行政主管部门组织编制。

第十七条编制风景名胜区规划应当依法通过招标、比选等公平竞争的方式选择具有相应资质等级的单位承担:

(一)国家级风景名胜区总体规划和详细规划,应当选择具有甲级城市规划或者风景园林资质证书的单位编制;

(二)省级风景名胜区总体规划和详细规划,应当选择具有乙级以上城市规划或者风景园林资质证书的单位编制。

第十八条编制风景名胜区规划,应当广泛征求有关国家机关、社会团体、企事业单位、社会公众和专家的意见;涉及重大公共利益或者与他人有重大利害关系的,应当进行听证。

风景名胜区规划报送审批的材料应当包括有关方面和社会各界的意见以及意见采纳的情况和未予采纳的理由。

第十九条风景名胜区总体规划和详细规划的审批依照国务院《风景名胜区条例》的规定执行。

风景名胜区规划经批准后,应当依法通过各类媒体向社会公布,任何组织和个人有权查阅。

第二十条风景名胜区内的单位和个人应当遵守风景名胜区规划,服从规划管理。

因实施风景名胜区规划对风景名胜区内的土地、林地等自然资源和房屋等财产的所有权人、使用权人造成损失的,应当依法给予补偿。

第二十一条经批准的风景名胜区规划未经法定程序不得修改。确需修改的,应当依照法定程序报原审批机关批准。风景名胜区规划未经批准的,不得在风景名胜区内进行各类建设活动,但法律法规另有规定的除外。

第四章保护

第二十二条禁止在风景名胜区内设立各类开发区,禁止在核心景区内建设宾馆、招待所、培训中心、疗养院以及与风景名胜资源保护无关的其他建筑物、构筑物;已经建设的,应当按照风景名胜区规划,逐步拆除或者迁出,应当给予补偿的,依法补偿。

禁止出租、出让风景名胜资源和风景名胜区。

第二十三条风景名胜区管理机构应当会同风景名胜区所在地人民政府有关部门,对风景名胜区内的古建筑、古园林、历史文化街区、遗迹、遗址、古树名木、野生动植物资源、特殊地质地貌等进行调查登记、监测,并采取建立档案、设置标志、限制游客流量等措施进行严格保护。

第二十四条风景名胜区管理机构应当会同风景名胜区所在地人民政府有关部门,按照有关法律法规规定做好造林绿化、护林防火和防治病虫害工作,做好泥石流、滑坡等地质灾害的防治工作和抗震设防工作。

第二十五条风景名胜区管理机构应当会同风景名胜区所在地人民政府有关部门,建立健全植树绿化、封山育林、护林防火和防治病虫害的规章制度,落实各项管理责任制,按照规划要求进行抚育管理。

风景名胜区内的林木属于特种用途林。名胜古迹的林木严禁采伐;风景林确需进行抚育和更新性质采伐的,地方人民政府林业行政主管部门在批准前,应当征求风景名胜区管理机构的意见,并按照国家相关法律法规的规定办理。

第二十六条在风景名胜区内采集物种标本、野生药材和其他林副产品,应当经风景名胜区管理机构同意;采集国家重点保护野生植物的,应当依法办理采集证,并在指定的地点限量采集。

第二十七条在风景名胜区内禁止进行下列活动:

(一)超过风景名胜区总体规划确定的容量接待游客;

(二)非法占用风景名胜区土地;

(三)从事开山、采石、挖砂取土、围湖造田、掘矿开荒、修坟立碑等改变地貌和破坏环境、景观的活动;

(四)采伐、毁坏古树名木;

(五)在景观景物及公共设施上擅自涂写刻画;

(六)在禁火区域内吸烟、生火;

(七)猎捕、伤害各类野生动物;

(八)攀折树、竹、花、草;

(九)向水域或者陆地乱扔废弃物;

(十)敞放牲畜,违法放牧;

(十一)其他损坏景观、生态和环境卫生等行为。

第二十八条风景名胜区内的河溪、湖泊应当按风景名胜区规划要求进行保护、整修,禁止任何单位和个人擅自改变水系自然环境现状。

第二十九条保护风景名胜区生物物种资源,维护风景名胜区生物多样性和特有性,不得向风景名胜区引进外来生物物种和转基因物种。确需引进的,应当经检疫部门检验同意,并经有关主管部门批准。

第三十条风景名胜区内禁止修建储存或者输送爆炸性、易燃性、放射性、毒害性、腐蚀性物品等危险品的设施,或者其他破坏景观、污染环境、妨碍游览和危害风景名胜区生态、公共安全的建筑物和构筑物。

第三十一条风景名胜区管理机构和风景名胜区所在地人民政府及有关部门应当建立、健全防火组织,完善防火设施。

风景名胜区管理机构和风景名胜区所在地人民政府及有关部门应当按照法律法规的规定对风景名胜区内的古建筑、古园林、石刻等文物古迹、历史文化街区、遗迹、遗址和其它人文景物及其所处的环境进行严格保护,定期维护,做好管理工作,建立健全责任制度,落实防火、避雷、防洪、防震、白蚁防治等措施。

第三十二条风景名胜区内的居民、游览者和其他人员,应当保护风景名胜资源,爱护各项公共设施,维护环境卫生和公共秩序,遵守有关管理规定。

第五章建设

第三十三条风景名胜区内的建设活动应当按照风景名胜区规划进行。

符合风景名胜区规划的建设项目应当经风景名胜区管理机构审核,并依法办理建设工程选址意见书、建设用地规划许可证、建设工程规划许可证和建设工程施工许可证。

风景名胜区管理机构应当配合风景名胜区所在地人民政府建设行政主管部门做好建设项目的建筑工程质量安全监管和竣工验收备案等工作。

农房建设的选址定点和建筑设计、施工方案,应当经风景名胜区管理机构审核,符合风景名胜区规划的,依法办理规划建设许可。

第三十四条风景名胜区建设项目按下列规定实行审批:

(一)在国家级风景名胜区内修建符合风景名胜区规划要求的公路、索道、缆车、大型文化设施、体育设施与游乐设施、宾馆酒店、设置风景名胜区徽志的标志性建筑等重大建设项目的选址方案,由风景名胜区管理机构提出审核意见,报省人民政府建设行政主管部门进行审查,按规定程序报国务院建设行政主管部门审批同意后,办理立项等有关手续。其设计方案由省人民政府建设行政主管部门审核批准;

(二)国家级风景名胜区内符合规划的其他建设项目,在省级风景名胜区内修建公路、索道、缆车、大型文化设施、体育设施与游乐设施、宾馆酒店、设置风景名胜区徽志的标志性建筑等符合规划的重大建设项目的选址和设计方案,应当由风景名胜区管理机构提出审核意见,报省人民政府建设行政主管部门审核批准;

(三)省级风景名胜区符合规划的其他建设项目,其选址和设计方案,应当由风景名胜区管理机构提出审核意见,报市(州)人民政府建设行政主管部门审核批准。

第三十五条在风景名胜区内建设施工,必须采取有效措施,保护植被、水体、地貌;工程结束后应当及时清理场地,恢复植被。

第六章利用和管理

第三十六条风景名胜区管理机构根据法律法规授权或者接受县级以上地方人民政府及有关部门依法委托行使相关行政管理职权。

第三十七条风景名胜区管理机构的职责:

(一)宣传贯彻国家有关风景名胜、民族、宗教、文物、林业、国土资源、环境保护、旅游、安全等法律法规;(二)保护风景名胜资源和生态环境,维护风景名胜区的自然风貌和人文景观,合理利用风景名胜资源;(三)协助编制总体规划和详细规划并组织实施,按照总体规划对风景名胜区内的新建、扩建和改建项目进行初审并按程序上报;

(四)建设、维护、管理风景名胜区基础设施和公共设施,规范设立风景名胜区标志、安全警示等标牌;

(五)制定风景名胜区管理制度和安全事故、突发事件的预防机制和应急预案,负责风景名胜区的游览者安全、环境卫生、治安和服务业管理等工作;

(六)按照规划组织和扶助风景名胜区居民发展具有地方特色的生产和服务事业,保护民族民间传统文化,制止和限制破坏景观、污染环境的生产事业;

(七)组织并负责对风景名胜区经营项目的招标和签约工作,监督风景名胜区内进行经营活动的单位和个人依法经营;

(八)负责出售风景名胜区的门票,收取风景名胜资源有偿使用费;

(九)根据风景名胜区资源的特点,向国内外、省内外宣传介绍风景名胜区特色;

(十)做好风景名胜区监管信息系统建设和管理工作;及时发布风景名胜区天气、能见度等与旅游相关的信息;建立健全档案制度和调查统计工作,按规定按时报送有关情况,形成完整的资料,妥善保存;

(十一)指导风景名胜区内的经营企业做好职工培训管理工作,定期对员工进行自然灾害、安全事故应急训练,提高职工的素质。

第三十八条风景名胜区管理机构不得从事以营利为目的的经营活动,不得将规划、管理和监督等行政管理职能委托给企业或者个人行使。

管理机构的工作人员,不得在风景名胜区内的企业兼职。

第三十九条风景名胜区内项目经营,是指公民、法人或者其他组织按照本条例和其他有关法律法规的规定,有偿取得从事风景名胜区内整体或者单个项目投资、经营权利的活动。

风景名胜区经营项目包括风景名胜区内交通、餐饮、住宿、商品销售、娱乐、摄影、摄像、户外广告和游客服务等,但宗教活动场所内的经营活动除外。

第四十条风景名胜区内的具体经营项目种类、标准、条件、期限和范围等经营方案,由风景名胜区管理机构拟定,报县级以上地方人民政府建设行政主管部门审核批准。

风景名胜区内交通等重大项目经营方案,应当经省人民政府建设行政主管部门组织相关部门及专家进行可行性论证并审核批准后,方可组织实施。

第四十一条风景名胜区管理机构依照有关法律、法规和风景名胜区规划,采用招标等公平竞争的方式确定项目经营者,并与项目经营者签订经营合同,依法确定各自的权利义务。

重大项目经营合同应当报省人民政府建设行政主管部门备案。

第四十二条项目经营者应当按照项目经营合同约定,缴纳风景名胜资源有偿使用费;在合同约定的期限、区域和范围内开展经营活动,保护风景名胜资源,维护公共利益和公共安全。

第四十三条未取得风景名胜区内项目经营的任何单位和个人,不得在风景名胜区内从事经营活动。

取得风景名胜区项目经营的单位和个人,不得改变或者超过合同约定的经营地点、范围、期限和收费标准等进行经营;重大项目不得擅自停业、歇业。

第四十四条利用风景名胜资源在风景名胜区内从事其他活动而受益的单位和个人,应当按规定向风景名胜区管理机构缴纳风景名胜资源有偿使用费。

第四十五条风景名胜区的门票收入和风景名胜资源有偿使用费应当依照有关法律法规规定实行收支两条线管理。

风景名胜区的门票收入和风景名胜资源有偿使用费应当专门用于风景名胜资源的保护和管理以及风景名胜区内财产的所有权人、使用权人损失的补偿。具体管理办法,由省人民政府按照国家相关法律法规制定。

风景名胜区的门票价额应当对老人、现役军人、残疾人、在校学生等实行优惠,具体优惠办法由省人民政府制定。

第四十六条在风景名胜区内设置、张贴商业广告,举办大型游乐以及影视、娱乐活动等,应当按规定由风景名胜区管理机构审核后报有关主管部门批准并按规定缴纳风景名胜资源有偿使用费和生态恢复保证金。

第四十七条进入风景名胜区的车辆、船只等交通工具,应当遵守风景名胜区管理机构的相关规定,按照规定的线路行驶并在规定的地点停放、停泊。

第四十八条根据风景名胜区的规模、资源保护和治安工作的需要,可设立公安机关派出机构或者警务室。

第七章法律责任

第四十九条违反本条例的行为,国务院《风景名胜区条例》和其他有关法律法规有处罚规定的,按照其规定处罚。

第五十条县级以上地方人民政府及有关部门可以依法委托风景名胜区管理机构行使相关行政处罚权。

第五十一条违反本条例第二十六条规定,未经风景名胜区管理机构同意采集物种标本、野生药材和其他林副产品的,由风景名胜区管理机构责令改正,给予批评教育,可处以100元以上2000元以下罚款。

第五十二条违反本条例第二十七条第(二)、(六)、(八)、(十)项规定的,由风景名胜区管理机构给予批评教育,可处以l00元以上1000元以下罚款。

第五十三条违反本条例第四十三条第一款规定,未取得风景名胜区内项目经营的单位和个人擅自在风景名胜区内从事经营活动的,由风景名胜区管理机构责令改正,给予批评教育,并处以1000元以上5000元以下罚款。

未取得风景名胜区内项目经营的单位和个人擅自在风景名胜区内经营重大项目的,由县级以上地方人民政府建设行政主管部门责令限期改正,有违法所得的,没收违法所得,并处以5万元以上20万元以下罚款。

第五十四条违反本条例第四十三条第二款规定,取得风景名胜区项目经营的单位和个人,改变或者超过合同约定的经营地点、范围、期限和收费标准等进行经营的,由风景名胜区管理机构责令限期改正,有违法所得的,没收违法所得,并处以100元以上2000元以下罚款。

重大项目改变或者超过合同约定的经营地点、范围、期限和收费标准等进行经营或者擅自停业、歇业的,由县级以上地方人民政府建设行政主管部门责令限期改正,有违法所得的,没收违法所得,并处以1万元以上5万元以下罚款;情节严重的,终止项目经营合同。

第五十五条违反本条例第四十七条规定,进入风景名胜区内的车辆、船只等交通工具,未按照规定的线路行驶或者未在规定的地点停放、停泊的,由风景名胜区管理机构责令改正,给予批评教育,可处以100元以上500元以下罚款。

第五十六条违反本条例规定,风景名胜区管理机构有下列行为之一的,由设立风景名胜区管理机构的县级以上地方人民政府责令改正;情节严重的,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员给予行政处分;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任:

(一)非法出租、出让风景名胜资源和风景名胜区的;

(二)擅自提高门票和风景名胜资源有偿使用费收取标准的;

(三)滥用职权、玩忽职守行为造成严重后果的。

第五十七条本条例第五十一条、第五十二条、第五十三条第一款、第五十四条第一款、第五十五条规定的违法行为,有关部门已经依照相关法律法规予以处罚的,风景名胜区管理机构不再处罚。

第五十八条本条例第五十一条至第五十五条规定的违法行为,侵害国家、集体或者个人财产的,侵害人应当依法承担民事责任;构成犯罪的,依法追究其刑事责任。

第八章附则

第五十九条本条例有关用语的含义:


(一)风景名胜资源,是指具有观赏、文化或者科学价值的山河、湖海、地貌、森林、动植物、化石、特殊地质、天文气象等构成的自然景观和文物古迹、革命纪念地、历史文化街区、历史遗迹、历史遗址、园林、建筑、工程设施等构成的人文景观和它们所处环境以及风土人情等。

(二)风景名胜区,是指风景名胜资源集中、自然环境优美、具有一定规模和游览条件,经国务院或者省人民政府批准公布、划定范围,供人游览、观赏、休息和进行科学文化活动的地域。

第六十条市(州)、县人民政府设立的景区景点可以参照本条例执行。

第六十一条本条例自2010年8月1日起施行。1994年5月28日四川省第八届人民代表大会常务委员会第九次会议通过的《四川省风景名胜区管理条例》同时废止。


陕西省人民代表大会常务委员会关于贯彻实施《中华人民共和国行政处罚法》的决定

陕西省人大常委会


陕西省人民代表大会常务委员会关于贯彻实施《中华人民共和国行政处罚法》的决定
陕西省人民代表大会常务委员会


(1996年9月3日陕西省第八届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十一次会议通过)


第八届全国人民代表大会第四次会议通过的《中华人民共和国行政处罚法》(以下简称行政处罚法),将于1996年10月1日起施行。这是我国社会主义民主法制建设的一件大事。这部法律的施行,对于规范行政处罚的设定和实施,保障和监督行政机关有效进行行政管理,维护公
共利益和社会秩序,保护公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益,促进社会主义市场经济的健康发展,都将起到重要作用。为了保证行政处罚法的贯彻实施,特作以下决定:
一、深入学习和宣传行政处罚法。全省各级国家机关工作人员特别是领导干部要带头学习行政处罚法,要从依法治国,建设社会主义法制国家的高度,充分认识贯彻实施行政处罚法的重大意义,掌握行政处罚法的基本原则和主要内容,增强依法行政的观念,各级人民政府及其行政执法
部门应加强行政执法人员的培训工作,行政执法人员未经培训合格的,不得从事行政处罚工作。各地、各部门要把行政处罚法列入全民普法教育的重点,采取多种形式广泛深入地组织学习和宣传行政处罚法,提高全社会的行政法律意识,为行政处罚法的实施创造良好的社会舆论环境。
二、规范政府规章行政处罚的设定。省人民政府、西安市人民政府制定的规章应依法设定行政处罚。尚未制定法律、行政法规或地方性法规的,省人民政府、西安市人民政府规章对非经营活动中的违法行为,设定罚款公民不得超过二百元、法人和其他组织不得超过一千元;对经营活动
中的违法行为,有违法所得的,设定罚款不得超过违法所得的三倍,但最高不得超过三万元;没有违法所得的,设定罚款不得超过一万元。
三、清理地方性法规、政府规章和规范性文件。省人大常委会、省人民政府、西安市人大常委会、西安市人民政府及全省其他有关机关要按照法定权限尽快对我省的地方性法规、政府规章和规范性文件进行全面清理,凡与行政处罚法以及其他现行法律、法规有抵触的,应予修订或废止
。地方性法规的修订,由原提请机关或单位提出修正案,提请省人大常委会通过或批准。政府规章和规范性文件由制定机关负责组织清理。地方性法规、政府规章至迟于1997年12月31日前清理、修订完毕。在清理期限内,未清理的地方性法规、政府规章仍然有效,但行政处罚法施
行以后,必须执行行政处罚法的基本原则和实施处罚的程序。同时,新制定的地方性法规、政府规章要严格按照行政处罚法的规定设定行政处罚。自1996年10月1日行政处罚法施行之日起,其他行政机关制定的规范性文件设定的行政处罚一律无效。省人民政府、西安市人民政府制定
的规章应当按照《中华人民共和国地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法》的规定在报国务院的同时,报省人大常委会备案;西安市人民政府制定的规章还应报省人民政府、西安市人大常委会备案。省人大常委会、西安市人大常委会要加强政府规章的备案审查工作。
四、清理行政执法机构。全省各级人民政府及其所属部门要依法清理现行各类行政执法机构,凡行政机关内设机构以自己名义实施行政处罚的,政府规章和规范性文件授权实施行政处罚的,没有法律、法规、规章依据行政机关委托实施行政处罚的,要尽快清理、纠正。行政处罚法施行
后,凡不符合法定条件的组织和单位一律不得实施行政处罚,不符合法定条件的组织和单位实施行政处罚的,要依法追究主管部门负责人和直接责任人的责任。要建立高效、廉洁的执法队伍,加强对执法人员的资格培训、证件和着装管理,改变行政罚款与行政执法机关及其人员利益直接挂
钩的做法,停止合同工、临时工从事行政处罚工作。要通过建立健全实施行政处罚主体资格制度,提高行政执法的权威和效率。
五、重视地方性法规、政府规章的公布和宣传。行政处罚法规定:“对违法行为给予行政处罚的规定必须公布;未经公布的,不得作为行政处罚的依据。”根据这一规定和省人大常委会制定地方性法规程序的规定,省人大常委会通过的地方性法规,应于10日内在《陕西日报》上公告
公布。省人大常委会批准的地方性法规,西安市人大常委会应于10日内在《西安日报》上公告公布。省人民政府、西安市人民政府制定的规章设定行政处罚的规定应当在其指定的报刊上向社会公布。凡未经公布的行政处罚的规定,公民、法人和其他组织不受该规定的行政处罚。《陕西日
报》、《西安日报》及省、西安市人民政府指定的报刊应当依照本决定的要求刊登地方性法规、政府规章。全省各级国家机关及有关部门、各新闻单位要加强地方性法规、政府规章的宣传,使地方性法规、政府规章在促进与保障我省改革开放、经济建设和社会进步方面发挥更大的作用。
六、加强对行政处罚法实施的监督。全省各级人大常委会要认真履行职权,把行政处罚法的实施情况作为执法检查的一项重要内容,对发现的问题和违法案件,要监督有关机关依法处理,维护国家法制的统一和尊严。县级以上人民政府应加强对行政处罚的监督检查,及时纠正违法设定
和违法实施行政处罚的行为。各级人民法院、人民检察院要加强行政审判工作和法律监督工作,保障行政处罚法的贯彻实施。各党派、人民团体、企业事业单位和全省人民要支持和监督行政机关依法行政,自觉维护社会管理秩序,依法维护自身合法权益,为实现依法治省和促进我省经济、
社会全面发展而共同努力。



1996年9月3日